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Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
Abstract
The first part of this paper is a review of significant papers in the vast literature on
optimum currency area (OCA) theory. The author focuses on the main classical
contributions, then considers modern treatment of OCA theory. The second part considers
empirical literature on the types of geographical areas that might constitute optimum
currency areas, particularly with respect to asymmetry and symmetry of shocks.
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Julius Horvath
Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä osassa käydään läpi sitä laajaa kirjallisuutta, joka käsittelee
optimaalisen valuuttakurssialueen teoriaa. Tutkimuksessa kuvataan sekä alueen klassisia
kirjoituksia että uudempia näkökulmia aiheeseen. Toisessa osassa tarkastellaan
optimaalista valuuttakurssialuetta käsitteleviä empiirisiä tutkimuksia. Pääpaino on sokkien
symmetrisyyttä koskevissa tutkimuksissa.
Asiasanat: optimaalinen valuuttakurssialue, epäsymmetrinen sokkiBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
7
1  Introduction
Optimal currency area (OCA) theory deals with complicated, inter-mingled issues at the
core of international macroeconomics. OCA theory’s main applications are found, to my
best knowledge, in three areas.
First, OCA theory has reshaped the discussion on selection of an exchange rate regime
for a given country. Although the criteria developed under OCA theory are not easily put
into practice, the substantial literature on selecting exchange rate regimes well documents
the rise to prominence of OCA theory in the analysis used in selection of an exchange rate
regime. Second, OCA theory provides considerable insight into the role of exchange rate
adjustment under balance of payment disequilibria. The extensive empirical literature on
measuring the symmetry and asymmetry of shocks to countries and regions well
documents this impact. Third, OCA theory has contributed to the theory of monetary
integration and has been fundamental in the design of Europe’s Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). It also provides a standard point of departure in discussions of dollarization
and creation of new monetary unions.
1
Broadly speaking, optimum currency area theory deals with relationships among
countries, regions, and currencies. The world is not a unity in a political sense; it is divided
into almost two hundred independent countries, most of which are further divided into
distinct regions. Currency considerations may take a fairly low priority at the time a new
state is formed. For example, the dozens of new countries that emerged after the collapse
of colonial empires, as well as those created after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, all
belong to currency areas. Yet, despite this foreseeable economic consequence of
independence, there is surprisingly little discussion of optimal currency area issues
preceding the disintegration of former colonial or socialist countries.
2
On the other hand, optimum currency area criteria have been (and to some extent still
are) at the core of the discussion on Western European integration. Questions, for example,
as to the degree Western Europe was an optimal currency area were at the forefront of the
integration debate.
For a country like the United States with relatively permanent political borders, the
discussion of optimal currency areas might appear moot. In fact, several studies consider
whether the US constitutes an optimum currency area. Ghosh and Wolf (1994), for
example, conclude the US is not an optimum currency area and tentatively suggest separate
currencies for different parts of the United States.
One needs to limit the currency area before considering its optimality. A currency area
is an area in which exchange rates are fixed, or which has a common currency. Under the
modern concept of “one country, one currency,” practically any country can be considered
a currency area. A currency area thus corresponds to optimum currency area to the extent
as the political considerations for creation of the country correspond to the economic
considerations of currency optimality. This brings up the Mundell’s great question as to
                                                
1 This view concurs with Bofinger (1994), who, despite his criticism of the theory, writes that OCA theory
“seems to be almost generally accepted as the main touchstone of the advantages of EMU and as the
theoretical basis for all empirical tests in this area.”
2 Willett (2001, p. 3) writes, “It is true that common currency areas are sometimes split apart as nations split
apart, as has occurred recently with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but there is little reason to think that
OCA considerations played any role in their desolution.” As few studies look at the disintegration effects
from the currency perspective. See Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc (1999) on the breakup of Czechoslovakia.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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what is the appropriate domain of a currency area: How large should the territory using a
single currency be?
The Mundellian question is traditionally framed in two ways. First, is a country, say x,
an optimum currency area? Does x possess such characteristics that allow it to use its
currency optimally throughout the country or would separate parts (regions) of x be better
off with their own regional currencies? Second, there is the supranational perspective.
Would x be better off as part of a larger currency area and without a separate currency?
3
One can also approach the Mundellian problem from another angle. It is commonly
accepted that monetary exchange is more advantageous than barter, so if it is advantageous
to use monetary exchange (currency) in a small territory, why not to enlarge this territory
to gain the advantages of money over barter in a larger space. How far is appropriate in the
territorial enlargement of a currency?
The ideal search methodology would consider the world economy and indicate how to
divide it into optimum currency areas. Grubel (1970, p. 319) notes that this would require
determining the levels of world welfare under different currency arrangements so that the
optimum currency area would be an area where this welfare is maximized. Mundell (1961)
and the subsequent literature dealt with more tractable problems. The interest moved
toward the search for criteria that would “define the optimum currency area, within which
the exchange rates should be pegged immutably, but whose rates should fluctuate, or at
least be varied, vis-à-vis the outside world.”
4
Usage of the terms “optimal” and “optimum” in the context of OCA theory varies.
McKinnon (1963) writes that optimum applies to a currency area where three objectives
are sustained: full employment, a stable price level, and a balanced external account. The
first two objectives pertain to internal equilibria, the last to external equilibrium.
5 Kenen
(1969) offers a similar definition: “If the prevailing exchange-rate regime, fixed or flexible,
can maintain external balance without causing unemployment (or, on the other side,
demand-induced wage inflation), that regime is optimal.”
6 Grubel (1970) explains that
“optimal” is used in to describe “the union between a number of regions or countries,
which improves welfare of the population resident within these territories above the level
enjoyed when each was a separate currency area.”
7 Allen and Kenen (1980) write that
“optimal” in OCA theory indicates a minimization of the costs of balance-of-payments
adjustment.
8 Melitz (1995) argues that it makes sense to speak about optimality when the
question is “what the optimum enlargement of the currency area would be from the
standpoint of the individual country or region in question.” However, he argues that if we
take the size of a currency area as given we already cannot speak about optimality, but
only about welfare improving.
9 Ricci asserts, “The nature of the issue makes it impossible
to find a rule of thumb for the identification of an optimum currency area (defined as a
currency are in which all members expect positive net benefits from their participation).”
10
                                                
3 Melitz (1995, p. 496). Demopoulos and Yannacopoulos (1999, p. 290) argue these two approaches are not
in conflict and each serves its own purpose.
4 Kenen (1969, p. 41).
5 McKinnon (1963, p. 717).
6 Kenen (1969, p. 41). Kenen (1969) notes that optimality should be judged from both the global viewpoint
and the viewpoint of the individual country.
7 Grubel (1970, p. 319). Grubel (1970) also considers the welfare of residents in a particular country as a
function of the level and stability of the real income and the level of national economic independence.
8 Allen and Kenen (1980, pp. 381-396).
9 Melitz, (1995, p. 496).
10 Ricci (1997, p. 33).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Rather than attempt to classify these definitions, I defer to the early observation of Mundell
(1961, p. 717): “The idea of optimality … is complex and difficult to quantify precisely.”
Such non-rigorous theorizing partly explains the disparate views about OCA theory.
Ingram observed, “I confess that I do not think the question of an optimum currency area is
any longer a very interesting one.”
11 Johnson dismisses the theory as “something of a dead-
end problem.”
12 Niehans claims the theory attempts to solve a “prohibitively difficult
problem,” noting that “the problem is logically similar to the problem of how a country
should be divided into voting districts in such a way that the parliamentary seats for a
given party are maximized. In its full generality, it is obviously a prohibitively difficult
problem, so it is hardly surprising that twenty years of academic efforts have brought little
progress toward its solution. What we have is a variety of suggestions about certain
elements that may play a role in the solution.”
13 Vaubel argues, “There is no operational
scientific method of measuring and comparing the costs and benefits of currency
unification for a given group of countries. For the same reasons, as we shall see, there is no
operational scientific method of defining optimum currency areas.”
14 Willett (1994) states
that “the theory of optimum currency areas points to many relevant considerations, but not
with a level of operational precision that would lead informed economists to always reach
the same conclusions.”
15 Bofinger (1994, p. 15) writes, “Taking into consideration the
obvious flaws of this [OCA] theory, it is surprising that it could experience such wide-
spread revival in the early 1990s.” Buiter (1995, p. 30) reflects that “the optimal currency
area literature is woefully inadequate and confused on the issue what policy institutional or
other behavioral changes are necessary in order to compensate for the loss of the nominal
exchange rate instrument.” Goodhart (1996, p. 1984) simply states, “I do not find this
theory [optimum currency area] particularly helpful.” Finally, we have the distinctly
different view of Krugman (1994): “I would suggest that the issue of optimum currency
areas, or, more broadly, that of choosing an exchange rate regime, should be regarded as
the central intellectual question of international monetary economics.”
16
With more than forty years of the literature on optimum currency areas to consider, I
pursue a selective approach. In Section II, I selectively review the classical contributions of
OCA theory. These involve the groundwork of searching for characteristics (criteria) that
could be used to define an OCA. Next, I selectively review some of the modern
contributions that reflect developments in international macroeconomics in the last twenty
years or so. I emphasize the empirical literature in Section III. Section IV concludes.
                                                
11 Ingram (1969, p. 96).
12 Johnson (1973, p. 395).
13 Niehans (1984, p.  291).
14 Vaubel (1990, pp. 174-176).
15 Willett (1994, p. 207).
16 Tavlas (1993, p. 663).Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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2  Theoretical contributions
to optimum currency area theory
2.1  Classical contributions
2.1.1  Mundell (1961) and the labor mobility criterion
In the 1950s, a series of papers questioned Bretton-Woods exchange rate arrangements
under which fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates prevailed. These publications identified
adjustment problems under fixed regimes and argued in favor of flexible rates. Mundell
(1961) summarizes the argument of proponents of flexible exchange rates: “Depreciation
can take the place of unemployment when the external balance is in deficit, and
appreciation can replace inflation when it is in surplus.”
17 If flexible exchange rates are
more advantageous than fixed rates, Mundell asks, does it follow that all currencies in the
world should be flexible? Furthermore, he inquires, are countries the proper units to take
advantage of different exchange rate arrangements?
Mundell observes that there would be a major difference “between adjustment within
a currency area which has a single currency and a currency area involving more than one
currency; in other words there will be a difference between interregional adjustment and
international adjustment even though exchange rates, in the latter case, are fixed.”18 To
illustrate this he introduces three examples of adjustment in different areas affected by
asymmetric demand shocks. The first example considers two independent countries with
national currencies, where each country is also a region. The second considers a country
with one currency and two distinct regions. The third involves two countries with
independent currencies and two regions, where both regions run across countries.
He begins with the two countries, assuming that an asymmetric demand shock
negatively affects country B: “To the extent that prices are allowed to rise in A, the change
in the terms of trade will relieve B of some of the burden of adjustment.”19  However, it is
possible that the unemployment pressure in B cannot be eased by increasing prices in A, if
A’s central bank will tighten credit to restrain inflationary pressure. Thus, the adjustment
falls on B itself, if prices in B cannot decrease then the adjustment happens through
decrease in employment.
He next discusses the impact of asymmetric demand shock on two regions in the same
country. An asymmetric demand shock affects negatively region B. As a consequence,
inflationary pressure occurs in A and creates unemployment pressure in B. The central
bank can ease the pressure in B by increasing money supply in the country as a whole. This
aggravates inflationary pressures in A, but may turn the terms of trade against B and
correct the employment problem in B.
In the inter-regional adjustment the trade-off between inflation and unemployment
ensures that unemployment in region B is prevented by the willingness of central bank to
inflate in region A. In the inter-national example, unemployment in country B cannot be
prevented as long as country A is unwilling to inflate. Mundell warns this logic only
stretches so far, i.e. it does not follow that if the world consisted of one country with one
                                                
17 Mundell (1961, p. 657).
18 Ibid. (p. 658).
19 Ibid. (p. 658).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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currency that unemployment could be prevented by the pro-inflationary policies of a world
central bank. The world as a whole is not an optimum currency area.
20
In the international adjustment example, assuming the other adjustment mechanism
does not work, flexible exchange rates, i.e.equilibrium could be returned with a
depreciation in B and an appreciation in A. But one may ask whether flexible exchange
rates help to ease the adjustment costs of asymmetric demand shock in all cases when
national currencies are involved, in other words are optimum currency areas identical with
countries?
21
Mundell responds that optimum currency areas are identical with economic regions,
when defined by inter-regional labor mobility.
22  In support of this argument, he brings up
the third example of adjustment to asymmetric shock. Here, we assume two countries, the
US and Canada and two regions East and West, so that the regions run across these
countries. East in both countries produces timber, while West makes cars. As a result of an
asymmetric shock, there is a pressure for unemployment in the East, which central banks in
both countries attempt to relieve. This strengthens the inflationary pressures in the Western
regions. If inflation is prevented in both countries, unemployment in both cannot be
avoided. The reverse also applies. In this example, however, it is not clear which country
should devalue, so flexible exchange rates do not necessarily bring back the equilibrium.
Mundell concludes the two countries do not form optimum currency areas.
While this example weakens the case for the flexible exchange rates, the argument
remains valid when currencies are organized at a regional, rather than national, basis. This
is the core of Mundell’s argument; flexible exchange rates between two countries are
preferable to fixed exchange rates, unless the countries themselves do not form optimum
currency areas.
If the sole goal pursued is economic stability, the greater the number of currency areas
connected with flexible exchange rates the better. But should every little place with
immobile labor be considered an optimum currency area with its own currency? Again, the
answer is yes if stability (low adjustment costs to asymmetric shocks) is the sole criterion
for judging the usefulness of a currency. Mundell writes, “...if then, the goals of internal
stability are to be rigidly pursued, it follows that the greater is the number of separate
currency areas in the world, the more successfully will these goals be attained.”
23
However, if we consider the costs of having many currencies, some tradeoff must be
found. Mundell sets forth additional arguments against an extremely large number of
currency areas. Besides money-changing costs, a large number of currency areas means
that market for foreign exchange would be very thin. Moreover, in very small currency
areas, imports are likely to play a huge role in regional consumption, which in turn
weakens the possibility for money illusion.
                                                
20 If one considers the “inconvenience of money-changing” as the only cost of the existence of multiple
currencies, then the world is an optimum currency area. With one world currency, the “inconvenience”
disappears. Before OCA theory emerged, proponents of a single world currency frequently offered this
argument. The Mundellian argument that the world is not an optimum currency area, in contrast, recognizes
the stabilizing function of the exchange rate.
21 The argument for flexible exchange rates builds on the notion that people are unlikely to accept variation in
their real income, or variations in the money wage or price level, yet readily accept variations in real income
through changes in the rate of exchange. McKinnon (1963) develops this idea extensively.
22 Mundell defines region in terms of factor mobility. Internal factor mobility and external factor immobility
characterize an economic region.
23 Mundell (1961, p. 662).Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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In summary, the argument for flexible exchange rates rests on the closeness with which
countries correspond to regions. If a nation is an economic region with internal factor
mobility and external factor immobility, the argument for flexible exchange rates holds. If
nations are dissimilar to regions, fixed exchange rates may do as well as flexible exchange















2.1.2  Discussion of Mundell’s contribution
Mundell’s seminal paper remains a pleasure to read.
25 As with most frame-breaking
contributions, it received a thorough peer review and raised several controversial points.
The first point of contention is Mundell’s definition of region, which is neither
geographical nor political. As Kenen (1969, p. 44) points out, “perfect interregional labor
mobility requires perfect occupational mobility. And this can only come about when labor
is homogenous.” If one sticks to this interpretation of Mundell’s original definition, an
optimum currency area always has to be small. On the other hand, if there were perfect













McKinnon (1963) also qualifies Mundell’s concept of labor mobility. If each region
contains specialized industry, it may be difficult to distinguish between low geographic
and low inter-industrial labor mobility. For example, if a negative asymmetric shock
affects region B and there is a possibility in region B to develop A-type industries, the
“need for factor movement between A and B is not great. … But if B cannot easily develop
A-type industries, then factor movements to A may be the only thing that will prevent a
large fall in the unit incomes of potentially mobile factors of production in B.” (p. 724)
Grubel (1970, p. 321) argues Mundell’s definition of region is inapplicable to real
world problems, because Mundell does not distinguish between different degrees of labor
mobility. Grubel writes that Mundell’s definition of regions, i.e. “regions are areas within
which there is factor mobility, but between which there is factor immobility” (Mundell,
1961, p. 658) is too broad and has little practical application.
Giersch (1973) reasons that Mundell’s concept of factor mobility implies that in the
long run the world is an optimum currency area. In Mundell’s view, labor mobility justifies
fixed exchange rates, since sufficiently mobile labor weakens the need for flexible
exchange rates. But “since mobility is a function of time and hence very high in the long
                                                
24 Ibid. (1961, p. 663).
25 Mundel received the 1999 Nobel Prize for Economics “for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under
different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas.”Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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run, even over large distances, the logical conclusion seems to be that in the long run the
optimum currency area must be the whole world.” Giersch (1973) also points out to
situation in which migration could be the worst response to balance of payments
adjustment since migration is very likely irreversible.
Corden (1973) is rather skeptical concerning the importance of labor mobility in the













Corden (1973, pp.168-169) argues that short-run capital mobility can be helpful, but in the
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Corden (1973) also argues that Mundell’s adjustment mechanism impliedly assumes













Ingram (1969) notes that in defining regions Mundell emphasizes labor, instead of capital,
mobility. He further argues that Mundell’s analysis in a multi-region area leads to the
conclusion that “when one region has unemployment, other regions will have to accept
inflation in order to relieve the unemployment. Thus, we expect differing degrees of









                                                
26 Corden (1973, p. 168).
27 Salant (1973, pp. 201-202) writes, “Corden’s rationale for a deficit region not being able to borrow
indefinitely to finance its deficit depends on the assumption that such borrowing absorbs an increasing
proportion of financial resources available to the region from outside. This is not necessarily true in a growth
situation; if the growth of financial resources available to the region is greater than the rate of growth of its
borrowing, then the process could continue indefinitely.”Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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Bofinger (1994) counters Mundell’s argument with an example that considers a country
affected by a negative demand shocks to a good, which constitutes only a minor portion of
country’s production and which is not produced in other member-countries.
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There is also skepticism as to whether exchange rate adjustment to asymmetric shocks is
the least costly way of adjustment in the case of sticky prices, low labor mobility and no
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Another argument may be made that devaluation does not always have a positive effect on
output, and sometimes this effect is contractionary.
30 Bofinger (1994, p. 11) puts it in a
very direct way: “Therefore, the empirical evidence for a reliable reaction of flexible
exchange rates to asymmetric real shocks is simply not existent.”
Mundell’s basic argument survives despite these valid criticisms. Mundell’s labor
mobility is today understood as a criterion of defining an optimum currency area.
Subsequent research puts forward additional criteria, some of which I review below.
                                                
28 Melitz (1995, p. 499).
29 Bofinger (1994, p. 8). He further argues that thinking based on a “one-country, one-sector” model with an
adjustment mechanism dependent on downward inflexibility of prices and wages and money illusion led
economists to the fallacy that the nominal exchange rate is useful for changing relative prices. Furthermore,
he sees as misplaced the emphasis on the real asymmetric shocks, since asymmetric monetary shocks have
far wider reaching consequences for highly diversified economies.
30 Krugman and Taylor (1978) initiated the contractionary devaluation debate. For an excellent review, see
Agenor and Montiel (1996). Furthermore, countries with firms that have large currency liabilities may force
such firms into bankruptcy in the event of a large-scale devaluation (Calvo, 1999). Other researchers argue
that the exchange rate follows a random walk, i.e. there is no reliable relation between fundamentals and
exchange rates.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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2.1.3  Degree of openness
McKinnon (1963) considers the openness of economy, defined as the ratio of tradables to
non-tradables, as the crucial criterion of optimality of currency areas. His argument is that
the more open the economy, the more it will be inclined to use fixed exchange rates, i.e.
flexible exchange rates are more advantageous for fairly closed economies.
Consider a small country in which the ratio of exportables, X1 and importables, X2 to
non-tradables X3 is rather high. Under flexible exchange rate arrangements price of
exportables, P1 and importables, P2 expressed in domestic currency varies with the
exchange rate, while P3 may be assumed constant. Consequently, in small open economy,
fluctuations in the exchange rate contradict to efforts to maintain stable price level. The
picture is different in a large country with sizable production of non-tradable goods. The
devaluation would have an effect on P1 and P2 but the effect on the general price index will
be lower than in the case of small open economy. In McKinnon’s words (p. 719), “...if we
move across the spectrum from closed to open economies, flexible exchange rates become
both less effective as a control device for external balance and more damaging to internal
price level stability.”
Thus, small open economies may find it beneficial to join larger currency areas.
31
McKinnon (1963) makes a case that economies with high ratio of tradables to non-
tradables should rely more on fiscal and monetary policies than on exchange rates to cure
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Thus, small countries that trade extensively find it beneficial to form currency areas.
Ishiyama (1975) notes that McKinnon (1963) assumes that the outside world price level is
stable. Otherwise, his argument could be completely reversed, since “external instability
would be directly propagated to the domestic economy through fixed exchange.” Giersch
(1973) makes a similar point: the more open is the economy the more it may need
exchange rate flexibility, since it may be more exposed to cyclical disturbances from the
outside world from which it wants to isolate itself.
McKinnon (1963) raises another point which favors fixed exchange rates in
small open economies: the higher probability of the absence of money illusion. The
presence of money illusion is what allows flexible exchange rates to perform their
stabilizing function. McKinnon argues the money illusion is lowest in highly open
economies. In a dynamic framework, this argument is hardly valid. The more times the
country devalues, the more likely the devaluation will have inflationary consequences, and
therefore decrease the probability of a future devaluation. As Mundell (1997, p. 34) puts it,
                                                
31 Ishiyama (1975) comments that similar results are obtained using foreign trade multiplier analysis with
constant prices. Here openness would be measured as the ratio of trade to income. Thus, the more open the
economy, the larger the variation in income under flexible exchange rates. Tower and Willett (1976)
maintain the view that the benefits from a monetary union increase with the degree of openness.
32 Presley and Dennis (1976, p. 19).Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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“The first devaluation may work without too much inflation; the second invites a wage
response; and the third provokes compensation demands.”
There is an additional argument that connects the size of a country with optimum
currency area issues.
 In a large area, it may be easier to keep the value of money “in terms
of a representative bundle of economic goods.”  “If the area under consideration is
sufficiently large so that the body of non-tradable goods is large, then pegging the value of
the domestic currency to this body of non-tradable goods is sufficient to give money
liquidity value in the eyes of the inhabitants of the area in question.”
33
Thus, the existence of stable large countries is required for small countries to
efficiently peg their currencies.
 34
2.1.4  Degree of product diversification
Kenen (1969) suggests production diversification as a characteristic for optimum currency
areas. He writes that a well-diversified economy will rarely confront changes in demand
for its export products.
35 In well-diversified economies, the importance of asymmetric
































Kenen argues that product diversification decreases the likelihood of asymmetric shocks
and alleviates their negative effects. Thus, fixed rates are “most appropriate −  or least
inappropriate −  to well-diversified economies.”
The core of this argument rests on the idea that “positive changes with respect to some
exports will be offset by negative changes with respect to others; as demand for some
increases, the demand for others falls. The more diversified are export products, the greater
will be this offsetting mechanism.”
36 A country that produces a wide variety of goods will
experience a slower decrease in overall production, if in the outside markets the demand
for its goods decreases. Thus, a country with a low degree of product diversification needs
flexible exchange rates to cushion it from outside shocks, while a highly diversified
economy may find it beneficial to form a currency area.
                                                
33 McKinnon (1963, p. 722).
34  Bofinger (1994) raises an argument against small currency areas, whereby transferring monetary policy-
making to supranational authorities decreases the influence of national politicians, i.e. the smaller the
currency area, the more serious the political interference with monetary policy-making.
35 ”... a well diversified national economy will not have to undergo changes in its terms of trade as often as a
single product national economy.” Kenen (1969, p. 49).
36 Presley and Dennis (1976, p. 24).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Mundell (1969, p. 111) responds that if one follows Kenen’s criterion of the optimum
currency area then “the most highly diversified economy is the world economy. Then, in
terms of an insurance principle and from the point of view of hedging against risks of
fluctuation, a world currency is the best solution.”
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Melitz (1995, pp. 498-499) doubts Kenen’s argumentation implies that a country with not
diversified production structure benefits from exchange rate flexibility.
2.1.5  Policy oriented criteria
The above-mentioned contributions deal with criteria that depend on the state of the
economy (labor mobility, openness, and product diversification). The discussion later
moved toward criteria that depend on desired policy tradeoffs. Ishiyama (1975) reviews
these criteria thoroughly, so I only mention those criteria that still seem to play a role in the
discussion about monetary integration. These include similarity of rates of inflation, degree
of policy integration, degree of price and wage flexibility, and real exchange rate
variability.
If the criterion is the similarity of inflation rates, then the concept is simple: it is
difficult to fix an exchange rate if one country inflates and the other does not. Fleming
(1971) notes a danger in the fixed exchange rate area originating from “the relative cost
levels of the participating countries [being] out of line.”
37 He also points to the danger that
being in a fixed exchange rate area may force a country to accept a higher level of
unemployment and a lower rate of inflation “that would correspond to their preferred
compromise between the two.” (p. 468) Haberler (1970) raises the point that it is not the
characteristics of the economy, but the similarity of policy attitudes, which creates the
conditions for a flourishing currency area. Fleming (1971) argues that flexible adjustment
of prices and wages to excess demand and excess supply would bring automatic
adjustment to asymmetric shocks, so the need for exchange rate adjustment simply would
not be there. If real exchange rate adjustment is needed, it does not matter whether the
required adjustment will happen through prices, wages, or exchange rates. However,
collective bargaining, monopolistic and oligopolistic markets, and natural or state-induced
monopolies reduce the extent of wage and price flexibility. Vaubel (1990) proposes the
real exchange rate as an optimum currency area characteristic, arguing that it is a more
comprehensive criterion than the traditional criteria of labor mobility, diversification, and
openness.
                                                
37 Fleming (1971, p. 468). In Fleming’s view, this can happen when there are differences among countries in
unemployment preferences, in productivity growth rates and/or in trade union aggressiveness.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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2.1.6  Political commitment to exchange rate decisions
A part of the OCA literature posits that an optimum currency area may be more about
long-term political commitment than economic criteria. Ingram (1969) claims that
economic considerations take a back seat in choosing exchange rate arrangements, so it is
somewhat futile to stress definitions of optimal currency area characteristics. What matters
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Mintz (1970) also emphasizes the political willingness of the central authorities to pursue
monetary unions as the most important factor for forming currency areas.










 This seems to be the opinion also of some authors in the 1990s. Goodhart (1995) argues
that any currency union formation is primarily governed by political concerns.
39
2.2  Recent developments in OCA theory
International macroeconomics has gone through substantial changes in the last two
decades. These changes are reflected in the discussion on optimum currency area theory
and in discussions on choosing an optimal exchange rate regime. A crucial change has
occurred since the early 1960s in the understanding of the inflation-unemployment trade-
off as confidence in permanent trade-off has broken down. Tavlas (1993) says OCA theory
has largely been modified as the discussion has turned to expectation formation,
credibility, and time inconsistency. For example, time inconsistency suggests that inflation
may increase if policy-makers and wage-setters engage in a game.
40 The costs of
decreasing inflation are also lowered as the credibility of the central bank increases. A
                                                
38 Ingram (1969, pp.  97-98).
39 Goodhart (1996) writes about EMU aspirations: “I shall argue that attempting to fix even more rigid, and
supposedly irrevocable, currency linkages in advance of, and in the absence of, political and fiscal cohesion
among the member states, is also a dangerous exercise.” (p. 1084). Goodhart continues, “What is clear is that
currency union is essentially a function of political cohesion.” In this context, Bean (1992) and Feldstein
(1997) argue along a similar line.
40 See Barro and Gordon (1983).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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traditionally high inflation country can gain credibility by “tying its hands,” i.e. pegging its
exchange rate to a low inflation country. Thus, joining a currency union provides an
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One can see the discussion on the optimum currency areas as a part of the problem of how
to choose optimum exchange rate regime. It should be noted, however, that OCA theory is
typically concerned with the choice between the pure float and fixed exchange rate regime,
while the economic policy-making is usually concerned with the subtler problem of
choosing among intermediary types of regimes. Apart from the attitude rooted in the
classical theory of optimum currency areas, one can distinguish three approaches in the
literature on the search for an optimum exchange rate regime. The first approach considers
a macroeconomic model and evaluates which exchange rate regime could ease the
response of the economy to different disturbances.
42 Thus, a country exposed to external
nominal shocks should typically use flexible rates to insulate its domestic economy. On the
other hand, a fixed regime can be useful when dealing with domestic nominal shocks,
while domestic real shocks are best handled under a flexible regime.
43
Buiter (1995) presents a thorough analytical discussion of the theoretical issues of
forming currency areas in the context of a seven-equation model of what he terms a “semi-
small” open economy with perfect capital mobility. In this model, Buiters distinguishes the
character of shocks that affect the economy. He identifies an important role for nominal
exchange rate flexibility in adjustment to real shocks. In the case of financial shocks,
however, the model indicates that exchange rate flexibility is undesirable.
44
                                                
41 Bofinger (1994, p. 21). In the same paper, Bofinger labels capital movements unconnected to
macroeconomic fundamentals as asymmetric and makes an argument that “the complete avoidance of such
[asymmetric monetary] shocks constitutes a very fundamental benefit of any monetary union.” (p. 25)
Furthermore, he makes a case in favor of larger currency areas, arguing that money demand is more stable in
large currency areas, since “intra-regional shifts occurring within a common currency area only affect the
regional money demand functions but not the national demand function.” (p. 26)
42 Following Poole (1970), this literature includes among others Fischer (1977), Flood (1979), and Frenkel
and Aizenman (1982). Aizenman and Flood (1993) present a two-country, one-good, one-factor model with
nominal wage rigidities. Productivity shocks in this model hit asymmetrically the two member-countries of a
currency union. Migration brings efficient adjustment through equalizing the marginal productivity of labor
across both countries. The model of Aizenman and Flood (1993) accentuates the insight that under sticky
wages and low labor mobility, a floating exchange rate may help the economy toward an efficient allocation
of resources.
43 See Argy (1990) for a review of this literature.
44 Real shocks are “IS” shocks, shocks to the private or public demand for goods and services, while financial
shocks are for example liquidity preference (money demand) shocks or shocks to the domestic money supply
process.  “Nominal exchange rate flexibility will cause financial shocks and other nominal shocks to result in
temporary changes in international relative prices and costs – changes that are unnecessary and harmful from
the point of view of the underlying real fundamentals and that involve real, albeit transitory, adjustment
costs.” (p. 23).Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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The second approach deals with the problem of the exchange rate regime in the context of
stabilization plans.
45 This approach considers a country with high inflation that wishes to
stabilize with minimal costs of adjustment. As Bruno (1991) shows, in the absence of
money illusion, when money is neutral and nominal-real dichotomy holds, the general
equilibrium analysis determines a unique solution for the real variables. The price level,
however, remains indeterminate unless another nominal variable is fixed, i.e. correction of
fundamentals is usually insufficient. Bruno (1991) shows that the corrected system can be
consistent with different inflation rates.
46 For this reason, a clear signal (such as firm
nominal anchor) of a shift in policy is needed. In a closed economy, the typical nominal
anchor is the level of the money supply or in some cases nominal wage. In the open
economy, the exchange rate is another possible nominal anchor. In the 1990s, country-
specific discussions of optimum exchange rate regimes were, to a large extent, framed in
this context, particularly in transition economies.
47
As the third approach, I consider modern theoretical contributions in the context of
general-equilibrium models and based on microeconomic foundations.
48 Helpman (1981)
and Kareken and Wallace (1981) show that in an environment where asset markets are
complete and money is neutral, the exchange rate regime has no social welfare impact.
Helpman (1981) concludes that the method for choosing among different exchange rate
regimes depends on the given rigidities and imperfections.
  
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The question thus becomes which regime is preferable under a given type of friction.
Subsequent work introduces various rigidities and imperfections into the modeling of
currency areas. Bayoumi (1994) and Ricci (1997) represent the literature in which wage
and price rigidities are the frictions, while in Helpman and Razin (1982), and in Neumeyer
(1998) the nature of the friction is represented by financial market incompleteness.
Helpman and Razin (1982) in a two-period general equilibrium model show that the
incompleteness of financial markets is complemented by channels through which nominal
variables have real effects, which allow them to provide a set of sufficient conditions under
which a floating regime is preferred to a fixed regime. In their model, a floating exchange
rate regime dominates a fixed regime, since the latter reduces the number of assets in the
economy.
                                                
45 See e.g. Dornbusch (1986), Fischer (1986), Dornbusch et al. (1990), Bruno (1991), Blanchard et al. (1991),
and Edwards (1993).
46 Bruno (1991) argues that what needs to be done first is to remove the real source of the disequilibrium.
However, it may happen that the correction of the macroeconomic fundamentals will not suffice to eliminate
inflation. Inflation has a life of its own, i.e. a corrected real system can be consistent with more than one
inflation rate. If, say, wages are backward indexed, i.e. even if inflation stops, lagged indexation may cause a
large increase in real wages. In that case, the past is not forgotten. Now, even if the economy is de-indexed,
there is still the problem of the credibility of the authorities, who are attempting to decrease inflation. Thus, a
clearly identifiable nominal anchor must be introduced to signal of a shift in policy.
47 See e.g. Guitián (1994), Bofinger, Flassbeck and Hoffmann (1997), and Horvath and Jonas (1999).
48 For an excellent detailed review of these contributions see Lafrance and St-Amant (1999).
49 Helpman (1981, p. 887). Kareken and Wallace (1981) indeterminacy result about the equilibrium exchange
rates may be interpreted in the similar way.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Bayoumi (1994) presents a model with regionally differentiated goods in which wages are
downwardly rigid. Each region can choose to have its own currency or join a union. He
presents a framework that allows him to incorporate several typical OCA factors as the size
and correlation of the disturbances, the costs of transactions between different currencies,
the level of factor mobility across regions and the inter-relationship of demand among
regions. However, Bayoumi (1994) assigns no role for financial assets or government
policy; in his model, each region is fully specialized in production of one specific good.
Bayoumi (1994, p. 552) then makes the surprising insight:
/ 
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Another insight from Bayoumi (1994) concerns the fact that the incentives for a region to
join a currency union may be different from the incentives to admit a region into a

















Ricci (1997) presents a model of optimum currency areas in a two-country trade regime
with nominal rigidities that allows for consideration of monetary and real variables.
Preferences differ in the two countries, which makes it possible to analyze the degree-of-
openness effect and symmetry of shocks in the creation of currency unions. In his model,
the net benefits from participation in a currency union increase with the following
variables: the correlation of real shocks between countries, the degree of adjustment of
labor and fiscal policy instruments, the difference between the inflationary bias of the
domestic monetary authority and that of the currency union, the variability of domestic
monetary shocks (which, in part, are transmitted to other countries inside the currency
union), and the size of efficiency losses eliminated through the adoption of a common
currency. Those factors that tend to diminish the benefits of monetary union include the
variability of real and foreign monetary shocks and the correlation of monetary shocks
between countries. In contrast to prevailing OCA opinion, Ricci (1997) shows ambiguous
effects for the degree of openness when both real and monetary shocks are taken into
account.
Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) develop a two-country model similar to the cash-in-
advance model of Lucas and Stokey (1987). In this model, they consider the issue of the
optimum currency area from the perspective of public finance. The optimal spreading of
tax distortions may require different inflation in different regions, so each region would
                                                
50 However, as Bayoumi himself writes, this result is model dependent. One can therefore imagine
circumstances in which a currency union benefits those outside the union.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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need its own currency to have its own inflation. They provide a formal definition of the
optimum currency area problem: the policy-maker must choose the optimal number of
currencies to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of households of the two
countries.
In a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets, nominal securities and
mean-variance preferences, Neumeyer (1998) shows that adoption of a currency union is
the result of a trade-off between the benefits of reducing excessive volatility of exchange
rates and the costs of reducing the number of assets in the economy. Neumeyer (1998)
differentiates between the economic and political shocks. While the fluctuation in
exchange rates that reflect economic shocks may seem excessive, they help allocate
resources efficiently. On the other hand, exchange rate volatility caused by non-economic
(political) shocks reduces the efficiency of financial market.
51 He argues interestingly that
“currency unions and permanently fixed exchange rate regimes can be viewed as monetary
rules that attempt to improve welfare by insulating money from domestic politics.”
52 On
the other hand, fluctuation in the value of money reflecting economic shocks maybe
“good,” as it increases the insurance opportunities available through trade in nominal
assets. As he puts it, “the loss of monetary independence … is socially costly because it
makes the real payoff of assets denominated in different currencies equivalent, effectively
reducing the number of financial instruments with which economic agents can share
risks.”
53 The main result of Neumeyer (1998) is that adoption of a common currency
increases welfare when the gain from “eliminating excess monetary volatility exceeds the
cost of reducing the number of financial instruments in the economy.”
2.2.1  The endogeneity problem
Frankel and Rose (1997) build an argument that the international trade pattern and
international business-cycle correlation is endogenous, i.e. countries with closer trade links
tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles.
54 In their opinion, joining a currency
union moves countries closer to meeting the optimum currency area criteria. In other
words, “a naïve examination of historical data gives a misleading picture of a country’s
suitability for entry into a currency union, since the OCA [optimum currency area] criteria
are endogenous.”(p. 2) Entering a monetary union increases the symmetry in the business
cycle of the prospective member-country due to common monetary policy and closer
international trade ties.
55
                                                
51 Neumeyer (1998, p. 246) writes that “Political interference in monetary affairs implies that given the
realization of an economic shock, there still is uncertainty about the future actions of monetary authorities
since such actions will be influenced by future political events. For example, the timing of monetary
stabilizations in inflationary economies, the value at which currencies enter a fixed exchange rate regime, and
exchange rate realignments are instances of monetary policy decisions that depend on the realization of
political shocks.”
52 Neumeyer (1998, p. 247).
53 Neumeyer (1998, p. 247).
54 Frankel and Rose (1997, p. 4) propose that “the more highly correlated the business cycles are across
member countries, the more appropriate a common currency.” If shocks are not correlated, but the cycle is
correlated between two countries, then, most likely, the propagation mechanism transfers idiosyncratic
shocks into positive co-movements of real variables.
55 Frankel and Rose (1997) argue that the relationship between international trade and symmetry of business
cycles is primarily an empirical one. If a closer trade relationship results in countries being more specialized,
then one should expect more idiosyncratic cycles. If a closer trade relationship results in an increase in intra-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) take the endogeneity argument a step further. They use a
general-equilibrium two-country, choice-theoretic, stochastic setting with imperfect
competition in production, nominal rigidities in the goods markets and forward-looking
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All in all, “the best institutional device to guarantee a credible policy commitment to a
monetary union is to have the monetary union itself in place.” (p. 22)
3  Empirical evidence on optimum currency areas
I now selectively review some of the empirical evidence presented in the literature, which
in some way was written in the context of OCA theory. I begin with a snapshot of OCA
studies and the world and then take a more detailed look at optimal currency areas in
Western and transitional Europe.
56
3.1  OCA and the world
To my knowledge, only two studies apply the theory of optimum currency areas on a
worldwide basis.
Ghosh and Wolf (1994) find little correlation between geographical proximity and the
grouping of countries into optimum currency areas. Thus, their model suggests that
restricting monetary unions into geographically neighboring areas implies high costs. Their
results also suggest that adopting a single currency is very costly for most regions in the
world and that most of the stabilization benefits across regions can be captured by a
relatively small number of currencies. Their results further indicate that adopting a single
currency around the world may be prohibitively costly, and imply that neither Europe nor
the United States form an optimum currency area, because, for both regions, the costs of
adopting a single currency exceeds estimates of the transaction cost savings.
57 Finally, they
                                                                                                                                                   
industry trade, then cycles may become less idiosyncratic. The authors present empirical evidence supporting
the latter view.
56 For analysis of shocks outside Europe, see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Horvath and Grabowski
(1997), Grabowski and Horvath (1999), Yuen (2000), Mkenda (2001), and Grandes (2003).
57 For example, they argue that for the US, G-7 or western European countries maintaining a single currency
would amount (or amounts to) around 2.5% of GDP yearly (ignoring the transactions benefits).  “With five
currencies among the fifty US states, and three currencies among the twelve European Union countries, the
stabilization costs fall to less than 1.5% of GDP. For other regions we consider, the CFA countries, the states
of the former Soviet Union, and the world at large, the costs of adopting a single currency are significantly
higher.”Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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argue that there is no advantage for Germany and the United States to join any monetary
union.
Artis, Kohler and Melitz (1998) taking two criteria of OCA literature (high level of
bilateral trade and symmetry of shocks) identify four large optimum currency areas in the
world, “Of these four large union, one covers virtually all of Western Europe; a second
encompasses all of Mesoamerica and the Northern ridge of South America; a third
occupies a good part of the Middle East, and a fourth englobes the entire ASEAN area,
including China and Australia.”
58
3.2  OCAs and western Europe
I next consider the exposure of an area to different shocks, and, to a lesser extent, the
question of labor mobility and production diversification.
3.2.1  Asymmetric shocks
The emphasis on asymmetric (country-specific) shocks is natural, since it seems that these
shocks represent a crucial component in the choice of the exchange rate regime as viewed
from the optimum currency area perspective. Is Western Europe a region where country-
specific, idiosyncratic shocks prevail, or it is a region where shocks affect all the countries
similarly? The earliest papers to tackle this issue were written in the late 1980s.
59 Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1992) performed measurement of the incidence of shocks using a
structural vector auto-regressive model in an effort to identify supply and demand shocks
influencing output fluctuations in EC and some US regions in the period 1960-88.
60
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) measure how the supply and demand shocks of different
countries in the EC and different regions of the US correlate with benchmark regions
(Germany for Europe and the mid-Atlantic for the United States). For Europe, they identify
a core and periphery, based on the idea that if the country belongs to the core, then its
shocks are correlated with the shocks to Germany. As Table 1 below indicates, supply
shocks are highly correlated with Germany in such countries as France, Denmark,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, while for other countries (England, Portugal, Ireland, Spain,
Greece, and Italy) the correlation is lower. In this respect the situation in the United States
regions is rather similar. There are regions with high correlation with the anchor region, the
core, and regions with lower correlation, the periphery. However, the economic weight of
the European periphery is greater. There is a noticeable difference between the correlation
of demand shocks with the anchor region in the US and Europe. In Europe the correlation
of demand shocks in EC countries with demand shocks of Germany is very low (higher for
                                                
58 Unlike Ghosh and Wold (1994), their program for finding optimum currency areas “displays a marked
tendency to identify monetary unions on a geographical basis.” (p. 27)
59 Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), Weber (1990), and the EC Commission (1990) were the first to attempt to
measure the symmetry of shocks in Europe.
60 Minford (1993, pp. 236-237) argued that what their structural vector-autoregressive model really obtains is
not the demand and supply shocks, but permanent and temporary shocks in terms of their effect on output.
Buiter (1995, p. 28) writes that it is not sufficient to “identify demand and supply shocks and decompose
them into idiosyncratic vs. common shocks. Demand shocks in turn have to be decomposed into financial (or
LM) and goods market (or IS) shocks for it to be possible to draw sensible inferences about the appropriate
exchange rate regime.”Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Denmark, France and Belgium, almost zero for Greece, Italy and Netherlands, and a slight
negative correlation for Ireland and Spain).
61 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) extend this
analysis to the EFTA countries and show that Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland also
belong to the European core.
Chamie, DeSerres and Lalonde (1994) decompose shocks to real supply, real demand,
and nominal shocks in a vector auto-regressive system using the growth rates of output,
prices, and money. They obtain monetary shocks by imposing the restriction of long-term
money neutrality. Their results indicate that in Europe only Germany and Switzerland are
strongly related to the symmetrical component of shocks. Other countries (Greece, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden) are not statistically related to the common component of
the shocks. Also relative to US regions, these countries face highly asymmetric supply and
real demand shocks. From this, they deduce that some European countries could face
significant adjustment costs when joining a monetary union.
Whitt (1995) obtained supply and demand shocks from different data than Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1992). Instead of real GDP and GDP deflator he used monthly data for
industrial production and price index. His analysis indicates that only France, Italy, and the
Netherlands show substantial positive correlation of shocks with the anchor region
(Germany). He also concludes that Canada and the United States may be the best
candidates for monetary union, since they exhibit substantial positive supply and demand
shocks.
Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) compare eight US regions with eight Western European
countries. They find that “the relative importance of aggregate, industry-specific, and
country- or region-specific shocks in explaining output growth fluctuations is roughly
similar in Europe and the United States, with each of these types of shocks playing an
important role.” (p. 22)
Dibooglu and Horvath (1997) identify the shocks as supply, nominal, and real fiscal.
Using data for 20 European market economies, they compare original members of the
European Community to new members and non-members. Shocks are mostly country-
specific, particularly for newer members and non-members, suggesting the importance of
alternative adjustment mechanisms other than national monetary policies after the
introduction of a single currency. Funke (1997) shows that the correlation of shocks among
the EU countries is much lower than within Germany.
 62
Table 1 below compares these results.
                                                
61 Bean (1992, p. 37) provides an interesting conjecture concerning the lower correlation of shocks in Europe
relative to the US. “One would expect the cross-country correlation of demand shocks to be lower in Europe
than in the United States, because there were periods in the sample when European countries pursued largely
independent monetary policies and because the federal income tax and social security system in the United
States ensures that the fiscal shocks are correlated across regions.”
62 Lafrance and St-Amant (1999, p. 7) comment on these empirical results: “Although the contemporaneous
correlation of shocks might be relatively low, the two economies could still be in similar positions in the
business cycle and not require divergent monetary policies or an exchange rate adjustment. On the other
hand, while the correlation of shocks might be very high, the transmission mechanisms might be sufficiently
different to justify an exchange rate adjustment.” Willett (2001, p. 14) critically asserts that “simple statistical
tests of past patterns of shocks, despite their recent popularity in the literature, are unlikely by themselves to
offer good guidance to future patterns of shocks.” Boone (1997) questions the exogeneity of these shocks by
arguing that parameters change over time. Melitz and Weber (1996) examined the correlation of the
structural components of output, and found more symmetry between the French and German economies than
was typically found by structural shocks.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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Table 1  Correlation of exogenous shocks between Germany and selected
               western European countries
Supply Shocks Demand Shocks Fiscal
Shocks
AB C A B C C
France 0.54 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.14 0.07 0.37
United Kingdom 0.11 0.45 0.36 0.16 0.31 0.00 0.11
Italy 0.23 -0.05 0.35 0.17 -0.28 0.09 0.38
Netherlands 0.59 0.51 0.45 0.17 0.47 0.32 0.05
Belgium 0.61 0.40 0.21 0.33 0.18 0.04 0.20
Denmark 0.59 0.31 0.42 0.39 0.24 -0.04 -0.13
Ireland -0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.16 -0.09 0.12
Spain 0.31 -0.25 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 -0.12 -0.01
Portugal 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.21 0.22 -0.02 -0.07
Greece 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.08
Austria 0.62 -0.26 0.34 0.17 0.12
Finland 0.22 0.12 -0.01 0.11 0.00
Norway -0.06 -0.25 0.12 0.22 0.16
Sweden 0.35 0.20 -0.09 0.26 -0.01
Results of structural vector autoregressive estimations
Sources: A. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) based on yearly data for the period 1960-1988.
 B. Funke (1997) based on yearly data for the period 1964-1992.
 C. Dibooglu and Horvath (1997) based on yearly data for the period 1950-1994.
These measurements, which focus on the contemporaneous correlation of shocks, appear to
indicate that symmetry prevails for a sub-group of countries. It also appears that
asymmetry prevails for some countries at the geographical periphery.
63
3.2.2  Labor mobility and product diversification
One important message of OCA theory is that countries affected by asymmetric shocks
need substantial flexibility in their labor markets. A high degree of labor mobility may
serve as a channel through which adjustment to shocks occurs.
Blanchard and Katz (1992) present empirical evidence that labor mobility in the
United States has played an important role in adjustment, substituting to a large extent for
price flexibility. Masson and Taylor (1994) compare the dispersion of unemployment rates
across both the US and Canadian regions with European countries. Their results show that
dispersion of unemployment is lowest in the US, higher in Canada, and highest in
European countries. In Europe, the higher dispersion of unemployment rates reflects the
fact that migration among European countries is clearly lower than among US regions or
Canadian provinces.
64
                                                
63 Goodhart (1996) writes: “There is, however, a reasonable case that some of the core countries of north-
west Europe are so alike in structure, facing similar shocks, with inter-twined economies, that a single central
policy would closely mimic their preferred national policies. But that is hardly the case for the peripheral
countries in Europe.” (p. 1086)
64 Labor mobility in the United States is roughly two to three times higher than in Europe; Masson and
Taylor (1994, p. 25).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991) measure regional and national labor mobility across
several western European countries. They show that the yearly flow of migrants among EC
countries is less than one tenth of the yearly flow of migrants between regions. They
compare the nature of the adjustment to shocks between regions of the same country and
between countries in Europe by computing different measures of real exchange rate
variability for different regions and countries for the period 1977-85. They observe, “The
variability of the real exchange rates of nations is about twice as large as the one observed
at the regional level.” (p. 4) The variability was lower in the EMS countries than in non-
EMS countries. Southern countries had a much lower degree of interregional mobility than
core countries, even if in Southern countries the regional differences in per capita income
were higher than in the core.
Bayoumi and Prasad (1996) investigate the degree of labor market integration for
eight US regions and eight EU countries. Their results indicate that the region-specific
shocks are more important in the non-traded goods sector in the US, while in the EU
country-specific shocks prevail in the traded goods sectors. The US has a more integrated
labor market, and in Europe labor flows do not seem to facilitate adjustment.
Fatas (1997) uses employment growth rates to approximate business cycle movements
and presents results, which indicate “national borders have seen their economic
significance reduced over time as the process of integration has increased cross-border
correlations and reduced within-border comovements.” (p. 743) Puhani (1999) estimates
the elasticity of migration with respect to changes in unemployment and income on the
basis of regional panel data for Germany, France and Italy. His results show that the labor
mobility is the highest in Germany, followed by France and Italy, but even in Germany the
accommodation of a shock to unemployment by migration takes several years. Puhani
(1999) concludes, “Labor mobility is extremely unlikely to act as a sufficient adjustment
mechanism to asymmetric shocks in Euroland.”
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One may argue as Krugman (1993) that greater integration among countries and regions
increases their specialization and thus the potential for asymmetric shocks. The counter-
argument here stresses that greater integration increases intra-industry trade and thus the
possibility for symmetry of shocks.
65 Kim (1997) brings evidence about long-run trends in
regional specialization in the United States for the period 1840-1987. Prior to the early
twentieth century, regional specialization was on the rise; but since the 1950s, the
                                                
65 This argument would be more in line with the message of Kenen (1969). European Commission (1990)
also argues that in the future European Monetary Union a reduction of asymmetries between member
countries may be expected.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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decreased significance of agriculture and manufacturing and the rising importance of the
third sector have led to convergence in regional economic structures. Fontagne and
Freudenberg (1999) distinguish between horizontally differentiated goods (two-way trade
in varieties) and vertically differentiated products (two-way trade in different qualities).
They show that only a part of intra-industry trade will increase symmetry of shocks,
because “a distinction must be made between greater horizontal and vertical differentiation
of production: growth in the latter process is not necessarily associated with more
symmetric shocks.” Their empirical evidence, however, favors the view that “the empirical
evidence of structural asymmetries between core and periphery countries no longer
justifies fears of cumulative divergence between members, within the EMU.” (p. 279)
3.3  OCA and transition countries in Europe
In the late 1990s, numerous papers appeared dealing with the issue of optimum currency
areas in the context of transition European economies.
66 This interest naturally reflected
the interest in these countries into the costs, as well as benefits, of joining European
structures. Several of the studies discussed below consider the issue of the symmetry of
shocks affecting transition economies. Horvath (2000) writes that idiosyncratic shocks
prevail between western EU members and the accession countries. Fidrmuc and Korhonen
(2001) assert that the correlation of supply shocks differs greatly from country to country,
although some accession countries are “at least as well correlated with the euro area shocks
as are many current members of the monetary union.” (p. 24) Frenkel and Nickel (2002)
conclude their study that “there are still differences in the shocks and in the adjustment
process to shocks between the euro area and the CEECs. However, several individual
CEECs exhibit shocks and shock adjustment processes that are fairly similar to some euro
area countries.” Table 2 summarizes the empirical results of these studies.
                                                
66 In one of the first studies, written at the beginning of transition, Goldberg (1999) argued that the optimum
currency area considerations should not be taken into consideration when transition economies decide about
their exchange rate regimes. She argues, “The supply elasticities required for the exchange rate to be an
effective stabilization tool may not be present during the early stages of economic transition. Employment is
not likely to rapidly adjust and even the (foreign and domestic) elasticities of demand for goods are
undetermined. In such an economic environment, the traditional optimal stabilization policy criteria applied
to output and/or balance of payments targets may not be relevant for the transition economy’s decision about
whether or not to implement or maintain an independent currency. Thus, it does not matter whether transition
economies satisfy the reference criteria that point to optimum conditions for introducing independent
currencies. The traditional optimum currency area criteria, interpreted in terms of optimal real stabilization
policy, are only useful if the exchange rate is able to effectively perform the task of short-term stabilization
(output or balance-of-payments) to which it is assigned.”[italics in original] (p. 3)Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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Table 2   Correlation of exogenous shocks between EMU, Germany and selected
               transition economies
Supply Shocks Demand Shocks
Germany EMU Germany EMU
AB CAA B C A
Czech Republic 0.538 -0.05 0.04 0.052 0.321 0.10 -0.15 0.213
Poland -0.494 0.00 0.08 -0.690 -0.200 0.14 0.28 0.217
Slovak Republic 0.384 -0.04 0.05 0.182 -0.097 0.04 -0.05 -0.433
Hungary 0.263 0.28 0.46 0.726 -0.197 -0.40 0.25 0.122
Slovenia 0.434 0.02 0.15 0.658 0.049 0.03 -0.18 -0.147
Estonia 0.036 0.08 0.25 0.339 0.343 0.05 0.12 -0.241
Latvia 0.022 -0.07 0.30 0.333 0.260 0.11 -0.49 -0.428
Lithuania --- -0.16 -0.11 ---- --- 0.33 -0.49 ---
Bulgaria 0.462 --- -0.03 0.280 0.250 --- 0.03 -0.224
Romania --- --- 0.02 ---- --- --- 0.03 ---
Based on structural vector autoregressive estimations.
A. Frenkel and Nickel (2002); quarterly data for the period 1993:1-2001:4.
B.  Horvath (2000); quarterly data for the period 1993:1-2000:3, for Hungary 1995:1-2000:3.
C. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001)
Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2003) instead of measuring the correlation of shocks as done
as in above papers introduce time varying correlation, thus they differentiate between the
overall transition period and the most recent period. Their results show an ongoing process
of demand shock convergence and supply shock divergence. Babetski (2003) finds that an
increase in trade intensity and a decrease in exchange rate volatility is associated with
demand shocks convergence, and he interprets his result as in support of the endogeneity
of the optimum currency areas.Julius Horvath Optimum currency area theory: A selective review
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4  Summary
In this paper, I reviewed select literature on optimum currency areas.  The message of this
theory can be summarized as follows: “There are costs and benefits to both fixed and
flexible exchange rate regimes and [that] these may vary substantially across countries
based on a number of characteristics.”
67 Fixed exchange rates or a single currency may be
more efficient than a flexible exchange rate arrangement for a small, open country with
diversified production structure and integrated within a given geographic area in factor
mobility.
68 The criteria suggested in the OCA literature give no clear-cut guidance for
choosing an exchange rate regime. Moreover, political factors seem to play important role
in such decisions. The theoretical considerations stemming from OCA theory are not easily
translated into practical procedures.
69 Nevertheless, this theory and its modifications form
the intellectual foundation of any discussion on currency unions. Concurring with Willett
(2001), I conclude that optimum currency area theory is essentially an approach to thinking
about exchange rate regimes. As such, one should not expect it to produce any single
quantifiable criterion.
70
                                                
67 Willett and Wihlborg (1999, p. 61).
68 Tavlas (1993).
69 Masson and Taylor (1993, pp.17-18) also write, “there is no single over-riding criterion that could be used
to assess the desirability or viability of a currency union.”
70 Swoboda (1999) also considers OCA theory “an analytical framework” for debates on creation of currency
unions.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/2003
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